Hofstadter has an article about traffic and the benefit of defection. A Universally Optimal (UO) path isn't necessarily Individually Optimal (IO) if everyone else is obeying the laws of UO. So if I know that everyone is going to obey UO laws, there's an increased incentive to defect to an IO route and save substantial time off my travel. However, if everyone follows the IO route, travel is slower for me than the UO route is for me.
The underlying theme of cooperation v. defection reappears through time, from the Ring of Gyges to the Prisoner's Dilemma to experiments with splitting money. I'd be all for a computerized traffic system if everyone had to follow it.
Experiments where n units are divided between two people where one person can split the money, and the other person can approve/disapprove of the split. If the second person approves, both walk away with the money, if they disapprove, nobody gets anything. I'm sure someone has links to experimental results, but if the divide is too large ($9 / $1), even though it's a gain for the second person, they reject the offer.
The underlying theme of cooperation v. defection reappears through time, from the Ring of Gyges to the Prisoner's Dilemma to experiments with splitting money. I'd be all for a computerized traffic system if everyone had to follow it.
Experiments where n units are divided between two people where one person can split the money, and the other person can approve/disapprove of the split. If the second person approves, both walk away with the money, if they disapprove, nobody gets anything. I'm sure someone has links to experimental results, but if the divide is too large ($9 / $1), even though it's a gain for the second person, they reject the offer.