To me the interesting vulnerabilities in these schemes previously were the "offline mode," where you need to be able to present a verifiable cryptgram without access to the issuers network. As I remember from several years ago, compatability with chip-on-card schemes that lacked the processing capabilities for RSA or space for ECC keys meant you needed to design the ID scheme to use symmetric key protocols, which forced offline modes to cache single use keys and the security of those were provided by counters and timers.
Once you move to mobile devices and "digital id" like the SMART Health vax passports, you can use asymmetric key based protocols, and you can do the offline verification by distributing the public part of the user certificate signing key to verifier devices. If it requires compatability with physical cards, it's using single use symmetric or stored keys for offline mode, and if it doesn't, it can use asymmetric keys for a verification protocol. In the latter case, my impression was that absractly, the vax passport verification protocol was not unlike JOSE/JWS tokens today.
The main failure modes are if the signing key gets compromised (as there was news one recently did) and someone starts generating fake vax passports and dilutes the system, or exploiting the recovery process where people can duplicate someones cert by getting it reissued to them.
Reality is, in a society with an internal passport system where you have to show papers for everyday movements, any constitutional rights or freedoms cannot be guaranteed because by being obligated by law to present ID, you are no longer a protected member of a citizenry with rights to move and associate, and in that instance you are are reduced to a political minority of one.
I get we need ID for online services (I do a lot of work in this field), but we do not need national identity cards to accomplish any goals those services provide.
> Reality is, in a society with an internal passport system where you have to show papers for everyday movements, any constitutional rights or freedoms cannot be guaranteed
Well, theoretically they can, it's just a system that is so easy to exploit that it doesn't make sense to lose time talking about the unexploited state.
Anyway, the entire problem here is with the "show your papers for everyday movements" part, not with the government making your papers easy to use.
It seems so reasonable, but when you make something easy, people (governments) do it. ID cards are an attractive nuissance for authoritarian personalities, you just don't equip them if you want to live without abuse.
I've worked in privacy, and unless you make an explicit and specific law against something, orgs are going to find a way to abuse it. One can absolute be in favour of identity cards and internal passports, but they should just not couch their authoritarian urges in "convenience," and try to make it seem like it's our own idea for our own good.
2 proofs of address, bank statements/utility bills etc; that are sent to your address with your name on.
1 form of citizenship proof such as birth certificate.
Additionally, Depending on “proof” level: notarized passport photo (by someone who is considered trustworthy, police officer, business owner, doctor) and whom is not related but whom you have known greater than 5 years.
Also additionally, parents birth certificates.
Had to do the last two to get my passport, notarized passport photo with two different people that were not family that I’d known for 5 years.
Recently moved to the UK from Denmark. E-government wise I would say the UK is at least 10 years behind. And now instead of just one authority that has my details. I've lost count of how many places I've had to send a copy of my passport. It just does not make any sense to not have some kind of national eID.
How easy is it to access that in Denmark though if you're not a citizen? I moved from the UK to Finland and had to:
- Visit the Imigration office with my passport (as an EU citizen I might add) where they took a copy
- Visit the local registry office with a bit of paper from the above, and my passport, where they took a copy
- Visit the tax office with my passport, where they took a copy
- Only then could I visit the police station with my passport (where, you guessed it) and/or a bank, with the passport (yes the photocopier worked well there too) in order to get access to the E-ID service. Which I will agree does make e-government superior to that of the UK, but, it was not 'frictionless' in the begining.
Also, a lot of EU people get caught out by the first step requiring an appointment which is usually months out (as being non-eu, weirdly you're almost in a better position because you can, or rather have to, get that done before you leave your own country)
Completely agree though that even as a citizen and living there all my life (until a couple of years ago) - the 'gas bill/bank statement' thing is a massive PITA. However a lot of places are trying to work out a better system and will use credit reports and fuzzy logic to validate your information to a threshold they're happy with. This is also something the government themselves are working on. Interestingly, as much as the Finnish system has saved me time, I just don't agree with the idea that the government should maintain some centrally accessible and enforceable registry of where everyone lives.
"Important" is the key word there. Going to a restaurant, leaving ones house, going to concerts, participating in sports, are not an important time to show a linked identification document and have it remotely verified by an authority, and recorded. Contriving the important instances is what makes internal passport systems oppressive.
I mean, in the US for decades "are you a citizen" seems to have revolved around whether you can present a yellowed piece of paper that has absolutely zero security features: your social security card. Sometimes a birth certificate, which has only slightly more security features.
Once you move to mobile devices and "digital id" like the SMART Health vax passports, you can use asymmetric key based protocols, and you can do the offline verification by distributing the public part of the user certificate signing key to verifier devices. If it requires compatability with physical cards, it's using single use symmetric or stored keys for offline mode, and if it doesn't, it can use asymmetric keys for a verification protocol. In the latter case, my impression was that absractly, the vax passport verification protocol was not unlike JOSE/JWS tokens today.
The main failure modes are if the signing key gets compromised (as there was news one recently did) and someone starts generating fake vax passports and dilutes the system, or exploiting the recovery process where people can duplicate someones cert by getting it reissued to them.
Reality is, in a society with an internal passport system where you have to show papers for everyday movements, any constitutional rights or freedoms cannot be guaranteed because by being obligated by law to present ID, you are no longer a protected member of a citizenry with rights to move and associate, and in that instance you are are reduced to a political minority of one.
I get we need ID for online services (I do a lot of work in this field), but we do not need national identity cards to accomplish any goals those services provide.