> iirc they still need a judge to approve employing these tools.
that's a weak point, not a strength, in various scenarious
a) Agency XYZ files a motion to have a member of their legal team promoted to judge at the respective courts. Motion accepted, judge signs off on all requests
b) judge simply doesn't care for privacy, if it hinders the boys at work, signs off on it, gets appealed later, slap on the wrist, no consequences, learn from mistakes, rinse and repeat, obey formal obligations this time
c) Police and Attorneys construct evidence to construe threats, judge Joe Shmoe believes it, signs off on it
Besides, the whole system has been found to hinder investigation. The need for a warrant in night time emergencies is already relaxed in some countries, far as I know.
d) More over, the judge is bound by law, so you can trust as much confidence in the judge as you want. Once precedent is established at federal court level, because of your we can trust the judges, it will be a slippery sloapy down-wards spiral for more invasive access for less serious matters -- if it isn't already. This is effectively the federal judge signing off on all warrants, subject to veto by a lower judge, what can be escalated back up the chain due to the power of attorney. Vice-versa, the state attorney is bound by executive orders from the ministry -- as was surely the case after Snowden ("no evidence") -- which has been repeatedly red flagged by EU reports (that are otherwise quite benign).
The defense is the defense attorney. The precedent is frequently established because a single lawyer fails to make a case. Subsequent cases are only accepted on special occasion, otherwise declined due to precedent. Subsequently there is only limited control over a lower court's decision. The guideline cited in all commentaries on German constitutional law is, when the decision looks plain wrong. It is of course a little bit more involved in detail, but the principle is not a judge but one single judge gets to decide. Which lays a whole lot of preassure on them. Of course you get a second chance pretty much unconditionally, but that's a concern for later only if something was found, in which case the chances for an appeal on principle grounds are obviously against you. Eitherway a due notice remains at the secretion of the court (ยง101b (6) StPO), which may mean the judge presiding over the chamber, or the court, I'm not sure.
An ironic corralary is that, of course they will at least take a look, which has to sound but cynic in this scenario.
> The fear with this is that they will try and catch all messages and retroactively look for bad actors.
Said Stephan Harbarth was in parliament and worked on a law for collective mass surveillance, which was subsequently called by the supreme court, in which he later went on to lead. Which is incomprehensible, because I was under the impression chief justices needed to climb the ladder first (ref, probably: BVerfGG).
Very similar, good ol' Mr. Biden signed responsible in 1991 on the American bill that is equivalent to the act under discussion here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/266 (see Title II, SubSection B: Electronic communication) not saying much at all.
This is entirely dystopic. The Bad Actors I have in mind are the good guys, I don't want to see the bad guys.
that's a weak point, not a strength, in various scenarious
a) Agency XYZ files a motion to have a member of their legal team promoted to judge at the respective courts. Motion accepted, judge signs off on all requests
b) judge simply doesn't care for privacy, if it hinders the boys at work, signs off on it, gets appealed later, slap on the wrist, no consequences, learn from mistakes, rinse and repeat, obey formal obligations this time
c) Police and Attorneys construct evidence to construe threats, judge Joe Shmoe believes it, signs off on it
Besides, the whole system has been found to hinder investigation. The need for a warrant in night time emergencies is already relaxed in some countries, far as I know.
d) More over, the judge is bound by law, so you can trust as much confidence in the judge as you want. Once precedent is established at federal court level, because of your we can trust the judges, it will be a slippery sloapy down-wards spiral for more invasive access for less serious matters -- if it isn't already. This is effectively the federal judge signing off on all warrants, subject to veto by a lower judge, what can be escalated back up the chain due to the power of attorney. Vice-versa, the state attorney is bound by executive orders from the ministry -- as was surely the case after Snowden ("no evidence") -- which has been repeatedly red flagged by EU reports (that are otherwise quite benign).
The defense is the defense attorney. The precedent is frequently established because a single lawyer fails to make a case. Subsequent cases are only accepted on special occasion, otherwise declined due to precedent. Subsequently there is only limited control over a lower court's decision. The guideline cited in all commentaries on German constitutional law is, when the decision looks plain wrong. It is of course a little bit more involved in detail, but the principle is not a judge but one single judge gets to decide. Which lays a whole lot of preassure on them. Of course you get a second chance pretty much unconditionally, but that's a concern for later only if something was found, in which case the chances for an appeal on principle grounds are obviously against you. Eitherway a due notice remains at the secretion of the court (ยง101b (6) StPO), which may mean the judge presiding over the chamber, or the court, I'm not sure.
An ironic corralary is that, of course they will at least take a look, which has to sound but cynic in this scenario.
Wikipedia lists several points of criticizm against the new president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (SCoG) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephan_Harbarth
> The fear with this is that they will try and catch all messages and retroactively look for bad actors.
Said Stephan Harbarth was in parliament and worked on a law for collective mass surveillance, which was subsequently called by the supreme court, in which he later went on to lead. Which is incomprehensible, because I was under the impression chief justices needed to climb the ladder first (ref, probably: BVerfGG).
Very similar, good ol' Mr. Biden signed responsible in 1991 on the American bill that is equivalent to the act under discussion here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/266 (see Title II, SubSection B: Electronic communication) not saying much at all.
This is entirely dystopic. The Bad Actors I have in mind are the good guys, I don't want to see the bad guys.